



ISGC 2017 Security Workshop

Sven Gabriel

Security Incident handling in Federated Clouds



Introduction

Introduction

Security in Distributed Infrastructures

Incident Prevention

Incident/Intrusion Detection

Incident Response (IR)

IR Communications

Containment

Forensics

Security in Distributed Infrastructures

Why bother about Security, another business model
Cyberbunker: *Mind Your Own Business policy*




Why bother about Security

Security always has an impact on how users experience services. How much you want to care about security is dependent on your business model. This has a serious impact and is a management decision, see for example:

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/technology/yahoo-data-breach-hacking.html?_r=1

How to sell security to the users/customers

Some sociology:



<https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43265.pdf>

<http://www.nature.com/news/how-to-hack-the-hackers-the-human-side-of-cybercrime-1.19872>

Examples from our Infra

- Request to patch, . . .
- You use our service from an unknown location, . . .
- no, we can't give you root on the compute cluster
- no, we will not install your preferred editor on our supercomputer

Goal: keep Users/Customers happy

Ingredients

- Have a clear set of agreed policies (ex. AUP)
- Be transparent on why certain actions are requested (Advisories)
- Use the proper 'language' for the intended recipient (Admin/User)
- Be prepared to deal with frustrated / swamped users.

Incidents, finally ...

Definition¹: A security incident is the act of violating an explicit or implied security policy (ex: local security policy, EGI Acceptable Use Policy) (<https://documents.egi.eu/public/ShowDocument?docid=47>)

- Who violates policies?
- Criminals: Automated Attacks, compromised systems rented out for illegal activities (Botnet, used for ddos, spam, distribute malware etc).
- Hacktivism, Creative young people
- Insiders, Users


How attackers access the infra

- External, unauthenticated Most serious, needs to be prevented
- External, authenticated Ex: stolen Credentials
- Local, authenticated Also: Impersonation Vulnerabilities

Security in Distributed Infrastructures

- Incident Prevention
- Incident/Intrusion Detection (also Tue. 16:00, Fyodor, Watz)
- Incident Response (Vincent)

Who can Work on Security ...



Incident Prevention

Vulnerability Handling Process:

- Vulnerability Detection (often external sources)
- Assessment (SVG/RAT) → Criticality
- If Critical, develop: HeadsUp/Advisory, Security Monitoring
- All Sites need to take action (patch/mitigate)
- Follow up (Ticketing)
- Monitor the Infrastructure

Why:

- Prevent being victim of standard attacks (check your logs, a lot background noise)
- Clean-Up of an incident is expensive!
- Provide an environment where users are "protected" from each other.
- If the infra is not usable/working (for whatever reason) will result in funding issues.

Goal: Reducing Security Incidents

Number of incidents using grid technology

Goal: Reducing Security Incidents

Number of incidents using grid technology 1

Grid/Cloud differences

- Admin / User role separated in Grid
- Grid Admins are Linux Systems experts
- Grid Software is verified against EGI's current Quality Criteria (UMD)
- FedCloud RCs (up to Hypervisor, Network) are managed by Admins
- VMs are managed by the Users

Some Cloud Security

Non System Experts (Users) are admins of their Infrastructure they deploy in the cloud.

- To mitigate this risk VM Endorsement Policy was developed.
- Distinguish between VM Operators/Users
- Provide the users with endorsed secure VMs

Incident/Intrusion Detection

Incident/Intrusion Detection



Tue 16:00 Identifying Suspicious Network Activities in Grid Network
Tue 16:30 Modern Monitoring Systems (Watz)

Incident Response (IR)

- Know your perimeter: Security Policies
https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/Security_Policy_Group
- Know your Infrastructure, who has which role, what are the communication endpoints.
- Have an Incident Response Procedure
(<https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/SEC01>)

Actors and Roles

- Site Security Contact
- EGI-CSIRT Security Officer on Duty
- User
- VO-Security Contact
- External party

IR Communications

Questions:

- You know now the actors, where do you get the contacts?

Questions:

- You know now the actors, where do you get the contacts?
- You know that the contacts are in <http://goc.egi.eu/> and <https://operations-portal.egi.eu/vo/security>

Questions:

- You know now the actors, where do you get the contacts?
- You know that the contacts are in <http://goc.egi.eu/> and <https://operations-portal.egi.eu/vo/security>
- So, ... what will you ask? ... report?

Questions:

- You know now the actors, where do you get the contacts?
- You know that the contacts are in <http://goc.egi.eu/> and <https://operations-portal.egi.eu/vo/security>
- So, ... what will you ask? ... report?
- , see https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:Incident_reporting
- Or

Questions:

- You know now the actors, where do you get the contacts?
- You know that the contacts are in <http://goc.egi.eu/> and <https://operations-portal.egi.eu/vo/security>
- So, ... what will you ask? ... report?
- , see https://wiki.egi.eu/wiki/EGI_CSIRT:Incident_reporting
- Or just contact abuse .at. egi.eu

Containment

- Stop the incident! How?

- Stop the incident! How?
- Stop a DN submitting new jobs/starting VMs

- Stop the incident! How?
- Stop a DN submitting new jobs/starting VMs
- Central Argus system

- Stop the incident! How?
- Stop a DN submitting new jobs/starting VMs
- Central Argus system
- For the forensics see Vincents talk

Forensics

Talk: Computer Forensics Analysis (FyodorVincent)

- What went wrong
- How to detect it
- How to react to it . . .