



Authentication and Authorisation for Research and Collaboration

Can R&E federations trust Research Infrastructures?

The Snctfi policy/trust framework

David Kelsey (STFC-RAL)

Co-author: David Groep (Nikhef)

ISGC2017 - Taipei

7 Mar 2017


A classic FIM4R use case – “Research Communities and eduGAIN”

- A research community wants to use federated IdPs (eduGAIN)
- But they have **many** distributed research community SPs
 - And they do not all want to (or cannot) join a national identity federation
- A popular way of joining the two worlds together is via an SP/IdP Proxy
 - Acts as an SP in the eduGAIN world
 - Acts as an IdP for the research community
- But still have to establish trust between the eduGAIN IdPs and the research community
 - To allow attributes to flow
- How can we build scalable trust?

- > ***Snctfi***


Flow of attributes and trust – via SP/IdP Proxy

Picture from GEANT – eduGAIN



AAI: The e-Infrastructure view

What is happening on top of existing Federation infrastructures today



Infrastructure Policy and Trust Framework – requirements

- To establish trust between eduGAIN and the *Infrastructure* (research or e-Inf)
- A framework which binds all IdPs, SPs and AAs together (within the *Infrastructure*)
- Enable eduGAIN & the R&E federations to trust the SP-Proxy (and hence its community behind)
 - To allow/encourage the release of R&S attributes
- The federations only see the SP-Proxy
- Q: Why should the R&E federations trust that SP-Proxy?
- A: Because the SP-Proxy asserts categories and assurance marks
 - R&S
 - Sirtfi
 - Data Protection (CoCo)
- The new policy and trust framework
 - Constrains the behaviour of the *Infrastructure*
 - To allow the SP-Proxy to assert R&S, Sirtfi and DP CoCo on behalf of the *Infrastructure*

“Security Collaboration among Infrastructures” (SCI) – our starting point



A Trust Framework for Security Collaboration among Infrastructures

David Kelsey¹
STFC Rutherford Appleton Laboratory
Harwell Oxford, Didcot OX11 0QX, UK
E-mail: david.kelsey@stfc.ac.uk

Keith Chadwick, Irwin Gaines
Fermilab
P.O. Box 500, Batavia, IL 60510-3011, USA
E-mail: kchadwick@fnal.gov, gaines@fnal.gov

David L. Groep
Nikhef, National Institute for Subatomic Physics
P.O. Box 41882, 1099 DB Amsterdam, The Netherlands
E-mail: davidg@nikhef.nl
http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1026-6696

Urpo Kalla
CSC - IT Center for Science Ltd.
P.O. Box 405, FI-02101 Espoo, Finland
E-mail: Urpo.Kalla@csc.fi

Christos Kanellopoulos
GRNET
36, Marousi Av. 11527, Athens, Greece
E-mail: skanot@admin.grnet.gr

James Marsteller
Pittsburgh Supercomputer Center
300 S. Craig Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA
E-mail: jam@psc.edu

¹Speaker

POS (ISGC 2013) 011

[Http://pos.sissa.it/archive/conferences/179/011/ISGC%202013_011.pdf](http://pos.sissa.it/archive/conferences/179/011/ISGC%202013_011.pdf)

- EGI, HBP, PRACE, EUDAT, CHAIN, WLCG, OSG and XSEDE
- Defined a policy trust framework
 - build trust and develop policy standards for collaboration on operational security
- SCI was used as the basis for **Sirtfi**
 - **A Security Incident Response Trust Framework for Federated Identity**
 - to enable coordination of security incident response across federated organizations

Why “Snctfi”?

Scalable Negotiator for a Community Trust framework in Federated Infrastructures

Snctfi

- As for “Sirtfi”
 - A meaningful acronym which is pronounceable
 - With no pre-existing hits in search engines
- “Sanctify” - meaning: make legitimate or binding
- Synonyms for “sanctify”:
Approve, endorse, permit, allow, authorise, legitimise, “free from sin”

Snctfi - the new Trust and Policy Framework

- The target audience is the *Infrastructure* as a whole
- Scope: The SP-Proxy, the SPs, any AAs, token translators, credential stores, ...
- Allow for different binding mechanisms, including contracts, MoUs, SLAs, or policies
- Build Trust between the *Infrastructure* and eduGAIN
 - And between *Infrastructures*
- This is not a REFEDS entity category
 - Rather an assurance mark
- Started from SCI document V1
- Added new policy requirements
 - E.g. behaviour of the SP-Proxy and Attribute Authorities
- Removed topics not needed
 - Detailed security requirements (as covered by Sirtfi)
 - Legal and management issues
- Reworded existing topics as necessary

Structure of the Snctfi document

- Background and Introduction
- Operational Security
 - [OS1] Abide by the *Infrastructure* defined security requirements, e.g. a CSIRT
 - [OS2] Meet the requirements of Sirtfi
- Participant responsibilities
 - Addresses issues related to user management, AUPs, security incident response, ...
 - Users
 - Collections of users
 - SPs
- Data Protection
 - Bind those SPs that consume eduGAIN attributes (and some collections of users) to either
 - A common *Infrastructure* Data Protection policy (framework)
 - Or the GEANT DP CoCo

Future plans

- Timelines
 - Aiming for a complete draft by end of March 2017
 - Then wider discussion with FIM4R and REFEDs
- “Publish” a version of Snctfi (as a proposed trust framework)
 - An AARC NA3 deliverable – to be completed before end of April 2017
- Then Snctfi can still be modified during formal adoption
 - In AARC2
 - by FIM4R/IGTF (and REFEDS)

- As an aside:
- SCIV2-WG busy in “WISE”
 - Can we merge SCI version 2, Sirtfi and this new framework?
 - <https://wiki.geant.org/display/WISE/SCIV2-WG>
- Decided to tackle this re-merge for SCI version 3

Thank you

Any Questions?

david.kelsey@stfc.ac.uk



<https://aarc-project.eu>

