

Evolution of SSH with OpenID Connect

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Motivation







Motivation

- Use benefits of federated identity management with ssh
 <=> Enable using ssh with eduGAIN login
- Reduce need for ssh-keys
 - Often not encrypted
 - Sometimes shared
 - Cumbersome provisioning processes (upload via web)
- Improve life of operators
 - Scaling is hard: key approval and distribution
 - User offboarding difficult (key binding is permanent)
 - ssh-keys live forever
- Fix ssh annoyances:
 - SSH-keys trusted permanently
 - SSH-keys can be shared across devices or teams
 - SSH-key passphrase cannot be enforced







Recap: Federated Identities

- Home Organisation (university, institute)
 - Authoritative source of
 - Identifier, Name, Contact Information
 - Affiliation with the institute
 - Basic Entitlements
 - Identity Assurance
- Community AAI
 - Delegated authorisation:
 - Community Group Membership (Entitlements)
 - Direct community authorisation (Entitlements)
 - Better defined set of attributes







Federated Identities [2/2]

- As a user
 - Single Sign-On (SSO)
 - No additional service credentials
 - => Increase in security
 - Less prior registration
 - => Increase in convenience
- As a service
 - Offload identity management to home organisation
 - Offload authorisation management to Community AAI (VOs)
 - => Reduce cost
 - => Improve user data quality
 - => Service is provided to a VO (not to an individual user anymore)
 - Improved security
 - Well defined incident response
 - Federated Security Operations









ssh vs federated-IDs

Feature	ssh / local-ID	eduGAIN / federated ID
Single Sign On	no	yes
Home-Org Identity Management	no	yes
Unix Shell Access	yes	no
<=> HPC Access	yes	no
git, rsync	yes	no
Shared credentials	yes	no
Permanent credential lifetime	yes	no
Unencrypted ssh-keys	yes	undefined
Federated (global) Authorisation (via VOs)	no	yes
Revocation / Offboarding	no	yes
Different credential per server	yes	no







One step back







Map federated IDs to Unix accounts

Why on earth?

- 1. We already have information about the federated user
 - Federated ID is conveyed via the OIDC Access Token
- 2. We already have authorisation information in the federated information
- The world consists of thousands of Unix servers
 - => We do not want to memorise different Unix accounts for each server (hundreds!!)
 - Nobody wants to memorise all those accounts







How do we map federated ID to local Unix account

- motley-cue: https://motley-cue.readthedocs.io
 - Server-side REST interface developed in HIFIS (Germany)



- Check authorisation
 - Based on entitlement (i.e. VO) + assurance + sub@iss (user whitelist)
- If authorised: return mapped Unix account
 - If mapping exists
 - Fine, we're done
 - If mapping does not exist (Optional)
 - Dynamically provision a user
 - Pooled-accounts, "Friendly" usemame, External username lookup
 - Multiple provisioning backends
 - Local, LDAP, Ticket-System
- Admin interface for security incidents
 - Suspend / Resume user









Cornerstones for KIT SSH-OIDC

- Use federated identity
 - SSH-Server has no direct relation with Organisation where user comes from
- Use federated authorisation
- Support for revocation (deprovisioning / offboarding)
- Create an ecosystem of components for ssh
 - Easier to support different use-cases
- Don't modify ssh
 - Patching ssh would result in forking => No







Implementation







Make ssh use Access Tokens

- PAM (Pluggable Authentication Module)
 - Standard Unix interface
 - Simple + well understood
 - Change the user prompt of ssh: Password -> Access Token
 - Verify Access Token
- Packages available for most Linux distributions
 - pam-ssh-oidc + pam-ssh-oidc-autoconfig
 - debian, ubuntu, centos, alma, fedora, rocky, SuSE, Arch
- User sends Access Token instead of password:

```
$ ssh testuser@ssh-oidc-demo.data.kit.edu
(tetsuser@ssh-oidc-demo.data.kit.edu) Access Token:
```







Get Access Tokens

- oidc-agent: https://indigo-dc.gitbook.io/oidc-agent
 - Just like ssh-agent
- Pros:
 - Secure
 - Easy to use
 - Largely non-interactive
- Cons:
 - Requires installation on (own) ssh-client computer







Map fed. User to Unix account

- motley-cue:small>https://motley-cue.readthedocs.io
- Client calls motley-cue before ssh
 - => get the unix username
- Only issue:
 - Opens a REST interface (on a server close to sshd)







New tool: mccli

- Automation of client-side tasks:
 - Obtain Access Token via oidc-agent
 - Get username for ssh server
 - via motley-cue REST interface
 - Put Access Token or OTP into password field

```
# Example
$ mccli ssh ssh-oidc-demo.data.kit.edu --oidc kit.edu
testme@ssh-oidc-demo:~$
```

- Pros:
 - PoC done: Federated ssh works!!
 - Many features integrated
- Cons:
 - Limited set of commands
 - Client software installation required









Usability Optimisation [1/2]

- Run client side in web browser
 - Get the Access Token
 - Fix software installation requirements
 - Ported mccli to javascript
- Simple web login (authorization-code-flow)
- Result: web-shell in your browser
- Example: https://ssh-oidc-web.vm.fedcloud.eu







What is still missing

- Advanced usage of ssh:
 - Tools on top of ssh: rsync, git
 - Advanced commandline: dd if=/dev/sda | pbzip2 | ssh fileserver "cat > backup.img.bz2"
- Reduce dependency on client-side components
 - mccli: Find a way to drop it
 - oidc-agent: if needed once per month, a web copy+paste flow is viable.







ssh-certificates







Recap: ssh-certificates

- Introduced with openssh-v5.3 in 2010
- ssh-certificates are not X.509
- ssh-ca signs: host keys + user keys
- ssh-certificates expire :)
- SSH server admin trusts CA to issue certificates only to trusted users!
- Different usage:
 - Provision public keys -> Provision ssh-ca keys







ssh-cer

- Certificates are ssh-k
- Certificates allow sim
 - principals, => lis
 - force-command, =:

```
$ ssh-keygen -L -f user-key-cert.pub
user-key-cert.pub:
    Type: ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com user certificate
    Public key: ED25519-CERT SHA256:rkSKv...
    Signing CA: ED25519 SHA256:xw9aV... (using ssh-ed25519)
    Key ID: "whatever"
    Serial: 0
   Valid: from 2023-09-01T14:30:00 to 2023-09-02T14:30:00
    Principals:
        oinit
   Critical Options:
        force-command oinit-switch marcus
    Extensions:
        permit-X11-forwarding
        permit-agent-forwarding
        permit-port-forwarding
        permit-pty
        permit-user-rc
```







oinit

New components to integrate ssh-certificates with motley-cue

- oinit-ca, an online ssh-ca
 - With REST interface (protected with OIDC)
 - Authorisation (via motley-cue):
 - 1. CA: Authorisation based on OIDC claims
 - 2. motley-cue: Find unix username for federated user
 - 3. sshd: Ensure a local user exist for federated ID
 - Optional Provisioning
 - oinit-ca supports provisioning via motley-cue
- oinit openssh: serverside components to support oinit
 - Mapping of federated ID -> local unix account







oinit client side

- oinit:
 - Helper tool to configure ssh to use oinit for selected ssh servers
 - Define which ssh-servers support oinit
 - ... and which oinit-ca to use
 - Once per computer lifetime
 - oinit add <ssh-server>[:<port>] http[s]://<ssh-ca>[:<port>]
- Purpose of configuration:
 - Obtain ssh-certificate whenever needed
 - e.g. expired, deleted, …
 - oinit mechanism is then used via ~/.ssh/config







Actual ssh call

- On first call to oinit-enables ssh-server, openssh-client will
 - Prompt user for oidc credentials
 - e.g. via oidc-agent or mytoken
 - Store ssh-certificate in ssh-agent
 - Refreshed once per ssh-certificate lifetime:
 - And do ssh:

```
$ ssh ssh-server.edu

[1] https://aai-dev.egi.eu/auth/realms/egi
[2] https://aai.egi.eu/auth/realms/egi (Accounts: egi)
[3] https://accounts.google.com
[4] https://iam.deep-hybrid-datacloud.eu
[5] https://login-dev.helmholtz.de/oauth2
[6] https://login.helmholtz.de/oauth2
[7] https://oidc.scc.kit.edu/auth/realms/kit
[8] https://wlcg.cloud.cnaf.infn.it
? Please select a provider to use [1-8]: 2

# Received a certificate which is valid until 2024-03-08
14:04:20
```







Future work







Future work

- Fix packaging
 - Not all tools interoperate out of the box just yet
 - debian, ubuntu, centos, alma, fedora, rocky, SuSE, Arch
- Provide consistent documentation of our Ecosystem
- Further integration
 - e.g. with Account Linking Service (ALISE)
- Security Audit
- oidc-agent forwarding
- Policy: More entries on the "How-long-should-an-xxx-live?" list:
 - X.509
 - Access Token
 - Refresh Token
 - mytoken
 - ssh certificate







Summary

- No ssh-daemons (or clients) were hurt in this project:
 - Unmodified SSH Client and Server
 - Backward compatible with: password, ssh-keys, 2nd factor modules, ...
- Supported platforms
 - Windows: Putty
 - Mac/Linux: OpenSSH
- Packages: https://repo.data.kit.edu
- Video: https://youtu.be/090D4s0TNaA
- Visit https://ssh-oidc-demo.data.kit.edu to try it yourself









More SSH Approaches

- Multiple different approaches exist
- Smart Shell
 - AWI, SURF
- SSH Certificates
 - DEIC
- PAM Module
 - STFC, KIT

Important
We are working together
to make things compatible







That's all







In case I talked too fast







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