Lockers: An Innovative and Secure Solution for Managing Secrets

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Security vs usability

Security improvements are often done at the cost of usability

- Long passwords with upper/lowercase letters, numeric and special characters
- 2FA
- Captcha
- ...

But in secret management service, we improve both security and usability without conflicts


First thought of secret management service

- Just deploy HashiCorp Vault and have it
 - It works
 - But we can improve it a lot
 - We can improve both security and usability

Quick overviews of existing features

High-availability setup

Three nodes, geographically distributed at IISAS (Slovakia), INFN (Italy) and IFCA (Spain)



Universal endpoint via Dynamic DNS

- Three endpoints, each can serve user requests:
 - <u>https://vault-iisas.services.fedcloud.eu:8200</u> (IISAS)
 - <u>https://vault-infn.services.fedcloud.eu:8200</u> (INFN)
 - <u>https://vault-ifca.services.fedcloud.eu:8200</u> (IFCA)

• How users know which service endpoint is healthy?

Universal endpoint via Dynamic DNS

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 - https://vault-iisas.services.fedcloud.eu:8200 (IISAS)
 - <u>https://vault-infn.services.fedcloud.eu:8200</u> (INFN)
 - <u>https://vault-ifca.services.fedcloud.eu:8200</u> (IFCA)

- Main, universal endpoint <u>https://vault.services.fedcloud.eu:8200</u> is assigned to IFCA or INFN endpoint via Dynamic DNS
- NEW: new universal endpoint <u>https://secrets.egi.eu/</u>

Easy-to-use client

- Issue: Vault client is cumbersome (needs two steps for each operation + 3 additional settings)
 - \$ export VAULT_ADDR=<u>https://vault.services.fedcloud.eu:8200</u>
 - \$ export ACCESS_TOKEN="ADD_YOUR_ACCESS_TOKEN_HERE"
 - \$ export VAULT_HOME=/secrets/YOUR_CHECKIN_ID@egi.eu/

 - \$ vault list \$VAULT_HOME

Easy-to-use client

- Authentication via access tokens (integrated with oidc-agent and mytoken)
- Working out of the box, no setup
- Simple, easy-to-use commands
- \$ fedcloud secret put my_app_secrets mysql_password=123456 admin_password=abcdef

```
$ fedcloud secret list
my_app_secrets
```

```
$ fedcloud secret get my_app_secrets
key value
admin_password abcdef
mysql_password 123456
```

Client-side encryption

- Users may need to store very sensitive secrets that absolutely nobody else can read them, by any means
 - Access tokens may be compromised
 - 2FA authentications are not suitable for automation
 - Solution: users encrypt the secrets before uploading
 - Very easy to use, fully automatic and transparent

\$ fedcloud secret put certificate cert=@hostcert.pem key=@hostkey.pem --encrypt-key
my-secret-passphrase


\$ fedcloud secret get certificate cert --decrypt-key my-secret-passphrase

• Security tips: use different passphrases for different secrets

NEW: Introduction of lockers

Motivations

- Authentication via access tokens from VMs is not optimal
 - Access tokens have too broad rights (to all secrets, to other services)
 - Should not be used on shared VMs or untrusted Cloud environments
- Lockers, the temporary, isolated storages for valuable items, are the solution
 - Create a locker, store valuable items there and deliver the key to recipients
 - No personal credential needed for retrieving valuable items
 - No access to other valuable items except the ones stored in lockers
 - Ideal for delivering secrets in untrusted environment like Cloud



Features of secret lockers

- Temporary, short-living:
 - Lifetimes: default 24h (client setting), max 32 days (system setting)
 - Numbers of uses: default 10 (client setting), max unlimited (system setting)
- Isolated, secure:
 - Lockers are completely isolated from each others, and from the main secret storages
 - The only way to access secrets in the lockers are locker tokens. Even creator or root do not have access by other means
- Non-personal:
 - Locker tokens cannot access other secrets outsides of the lockers
 - No personal data stored in the locker token
- Transferable:
 - As lockers are isolated and non-personal, creators can share/transfer the lockers and its content to others if needed

Creating a locker

```
$ fedcloud secret locker create
hvs.CAFSTGXXX
                             <= Print only the token, easy scripting</pre>
$ fedcloud secret locker create --ttl 24h --num-uses 10 --verbose
key
     value
client_token hvs.CAESIGXXX <= This is the token</pre>
accessor o3GXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
policies ['default']
token policies ['default']
lease duration 86400
       False
renewable
orphan False
num_uses
            10
```

Checking info of the locker

\$ fedcloud secret locker check hvs.CAESIXXX

key	value
<pre>accessor creation_time creation_ttl display_name expire_time id issue_time num_uses orphan path policies renewable ttl</pre>	<pre>qb52XXXXXX 1685008416 86400 token-token 2023-05-26T09:53:37.315243089Z hvs.CAESIGXXX 2023-05-25T09:53:37.315281071Z 8 False auth/token/create ['default'] False 86114</pre>
type	service

Accessing lockers

- Just set locker token instead of OIDC access token and use `fedcloud secret` commands `put/list/get` normally. No additional configuration needed:
- \$ fedcloud secret put mysecret password=123456 --locker-token hvs.CAESIXXX
- The locker token may be set as OS environment variable like access token


\$ export FEDCLOUD_LOCKER_TOKEN=hvs.CAESIXXX
\$ fedcloud secret get mysecret
key value
password 123456

• Note: OIDC accounts and access tokens are not needed for accessing lockers.

Accessing lockers via GUI

Users can login to Vault's GUI via locker token and manage secrets via GUI

Warning: the GUI exhausts number of uses very fast. Remember to set larger number of uses if experimenting with GUI



Destroying lockers

Lockers and all contents in them are **automatically** destroyed when their lifetimes or numbers of uses are expired (desired feature for security)

They can be also destroyed manually if needed by revoking the locker token:

\$ fedcloud secret locker revoke hvs.CAESIXXX

Special: single-use lockers

Why single-use lockers

- Sometimes, users need to deliver secrets via untrusted communications
 - \circ It is a big trouble if some secrets are stolen (passwords, tokens, ...)
 - It is still a much bigger trouble if secret owners don't know about that
 - Attacker may quietly abuse the secrets for long time and make much larger damages
- => Single-use lockers are the way to go
 - Autodestruction after successful delivery
 - Immediate detection of misbehavior if it happens

How to use single-use lockers

- Create a locker with num-uses=2 (not 1)
 \$ fedcloud secret locker create --ttl 1h --num-uses 2 hvs.CAESIXXX
- Store some secrets there. That will reduce number of uses to 1 (single-use)
 \$ fedcloud secret put mysecret password=123456 --locker-token hvs.CAESIXXX
- Send the locker token to recipient via possibly untrusted communications:
 - If the recipient can read the secrets, it is safely delivered, nobody else has read them before (and nobody can read them later)
 - If the recipient cannot read the secrets, it is a proof that secrets have been stolen. Time to alarm admins, change passwords, revoke tokens, launch investigations and do other relevant actions

Summary about lockers

- Lockers simplify delivering secrets to untrusted VMs
 - No need of access tokens, no personal data
 - Enabling single-use secrets for detecting misbehavior
 - Enabling deliver secrets to VMs owned by others

• Very simple usage

- Simplicity means robustness
- Can be used as key-value storage for distributed systems (e.g. federated learning)
- Compatible with existing commands (e.g. using client-side encrypted secrets in lockers)

More information

- Service URL:
 - https://vault.services.fedcloud.eu:8200/
 - <u>https://secrets.egi.eu/</u>

- Documentation:
 - <u>https://vault.docs.fedcloud.eu/</u>
 - https://www.fedcloud.eu/

Thank you for your attention