### UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY®

### A Simplified SDN-Driven All-Campus Science DMZ

Jacob Chappell, C. Lowell Pike, Dr. Cody Bumgardner, Dr. Brent Seales, Dr. James Griffioen University of Kentucky







### Where is Kentucky?





### Horse Racing and Breeding





### **Bourbon Whiskey**





### Tobacco





# Agenda

- Big data woes on the campus network
- Standard science DMZ solution
- Brief SDN overview
- A new DMZ approach
- Some results




# Big Data in Research


- Large data sets are becoming increasingly prevalent in research.
  - Machine Learning
  - Data Mining
  - Analytics
  - Modeling
  - Visualization
  - Simulation
  - ...
- Furthermore, researchers often need to move their large datasets between research sites and into and out of cloud storage.
- Traditional campus networks are not designed to support pervasive big data usage.



### **Typical Campus Network**



### **Typical Campus Network**



### **Big Data Woes on Campus Network**

- Middleboxes
- Competition: 45K students, faculty, staff
- Refresh needed: older infrastructure
- Backpressure: even with upgrades



### Middleboxes

- Packet inspecting/modifying devices scattered throughout the campus network.
- Provide important services essential to a stable and secure campus network.
- Impose intentional and unintentional bottlenecks in network performance.
- Provided services include:
  - Network Address Translation (NAT)
  - Intrusion Detection (e.g., Deep Packet Inspection)
  - Intrusion Prevention (e.g., Firewalls)
  - Traffic Shaping/Quality of Service Enforcement
  - Load Balancing
  - Virtual Private Networks
  - Content Caching
  - Pre-network-access Authentication




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Big data woes on the campus network


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
### How does one normally solve this problem?




### Move Nodes Outside the Firewall




### Move Nodes Outside the Firewall




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


### **Campus Science DMZ**



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




#### Disadvantages:

- □ Science DMZ machines are not protected by middleboxes.
- Campus (middlebox) policy enforcement is not applied to any traffic from Science DMZ machines. Even non-science flows (e.g., Netflix) bypass campus policy enforcement.
- □ Researchers must decide whether to connect their machines to the Science DMZ or the Campus Network.






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
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
### **Normal Switch**



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### **OpenFlow Enabled Switch**



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# OpenFlow : physical separation of network control plane from the data plane






# OpenFlow : physical separation of network control plane from the data plane





### **OpenFlow Rules : Match Packet then Take Actions**



#### Actions:

#### Drop

Forward – to port, flood, to controller, normal...

Set – mac, vlan id, ip address...



### How Does It Work?

Controller pushes initial OpenFlow rules to every switch

Match Action


bddp
forward to controller (topology discovery)

dhcp
forward to controller & Normal (end node discovery)

arp
forward to controller & Normal (end node discovery)

\*
Normal





### University of Kentucky SDN Implementation

- Long term goal: all campus networking equipment will be SDN capable
- Use Normal rule for most traffic
- Modify "special" traffic with OF when needed
- Examples of "special" traffic:
- Push large physics research data directly to Internet2
- Avoid middle box bottlenecks for special traffic
- Drop hostile traffic




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
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
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
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





















### Caveats

- Being on the SDN network does not improve normal traffic.
- By default, traffic still routes through the slow campus network
- High-speed is only enabled for "privileged" flows
  - Must obtain permission
  - Rules must be inserted to activate the flow




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### Perfsonar to Internet2

	[ ID] Interval				Transfer			Bandwidth	
A)	To nash-ptl.es.net								
	NORMAL	[	15]	0.00-30.00	sec	168	MBytes	47.0	Mbits/sec
	SDN	[	15]	0.00-30.00	sec	14.3	GBytes	4094	Mbits/sec
B)	To atla-pt1.es.net								
_ /	NORMAL		_	0.00-30.00	sec	189	MBvtes	52.9	Mbits/sec
	SDN	_	15]	0.00-30.00	sec		-		Mbits/sec
	<b>UD</b>	L	10]		500	1011	abjees	1000	
C)	To wash-ptl.es.net								
	NORMAL	[	15]	0.00-30.00	sec	282	MBytes	78.9	Mbits/sec
	SDN	[	15]	0.00-30.00	sec	24.3	GBytes	6960	Mbits/sec
D)	To fnal-ptl.es.net								
	NORMAL	[	16]	0.00-30.00	sec	453	MBytes	127	Mbits/sec
	SDN	[	16]	0.00-30.04	sec	34.5	GBytes	9879	Mbits/sec
UK									

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### Questions?

